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 
Abstract—  To accomplish secure group communication, it is 
essential to share a unique cryptographic key among group 
members. The underlying challenges to group key agreement are 
scalability, efficiency, and security. In a dynamic group 
environment, the rekeying process is more frequent; therefore, it 
is more crucial to design an efficient group key agreement 
protocol. Moreover, with the emergence of various group-based 
services, it is becoming common for several multicast groups to 
coexist in the same network. These multicast groups may have 
several shared users; a join or leave request by a single user can 
trigger regeneration of multiple group keys. Under the given 
circumstances the rekeying process becomes a challenging task. In 
this work, we propose a novel methodology for group key 
agreement which exploits the state vectors of group members. The 
state vector is a set of randomly generated nonce instances which 
determine the logical link between group members and which 
empowers the group member to generate multiple cryptographic 
keys independently. Using local knowledge of a secret nonce, each 
member can generate and share a large number of secure keys, 
indicating that SGRS inherently provides a considerable amount 
of secure subgroup multicast communication using subgroup 
multicasting keys derived from local state vectors. The resulting 
protocol is secure and efficient in terms of both communication 
and computation. 
 
Index Terms— Group key agreement, resource sharing, 
multicast security, dynamic system, scalability, confidentiality, 
rekeying 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the recent past with the advent of fast networking 
technologies, there has been a profound increase in the speed 
of the Internet and the degree of connectivity. In addition, with 
the emergence of new Internet applications such as video 
conferencing, online joint workspaces, group chat, multi-user 
games and online social networking applications, numerous 
possibilities for group communications have been created. 
Group participants share common interests and share the 
responsibility of secure group communication. In group 
communication, agreement regarding a secure group key is one 
of the most important and challenging tasks. Specifically, to 
maintain a secure group key in a dynamic environment 
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becomes more difficult as the reestablishment of the group key 
should be rapid and lightweight with regard to complexity. 
Secure rekeying becomes an even more challenging task in 
resource-limited networks such as wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) [1] and body-area networks (WBAN) [2], as most 
conventional cryptographic mechanisms and security protocols 
are not suitable for resource-limited WSNs or WBANs. For 
example, very efficient public key algorithms, such as ECC [3], 
need a fraction of a second to execute encryption/decryption 
procedures, while a symmetric key algorithm such as RC5 [3] 
needs only a fraction of a millisecond to perform encryption 
and decryption procedures [4-5]. For computational efficiency, 
secure group communication it is essential, with the group key 
following a symmetric key algorithm. 
For secure group communications, the two basic goals are 
authentication and confidentiality. Precisely, authentication 
guarantees that the communicating entity is an authorized 
entity, which is alive and participating in a protocol run 
according to a defined role. Further, the protocol run follows 
the correct pre-defined sequence of a protocol run, and 
confidentiality guarantees that the transmitted messages are 
recognizable and/or decrypted only by the intended entities. 
In this paper, we present a unique secure group key agreement 
protocol suite known as SGRS (Secure Group key-agreement 
with Random nonce Sharing). SGRS is a decentralized and 
distributed protocol; it is decentralized because for scalable 
instances of SGRS, the groups are cascaded into larger groups 
(Section IV-E), and it is distributed because all of the nodes in 
each group contribute to computing the keying material. The 
SGRS protocol suite consists of four underlying protocols: the 
Join, Leave, Merge and Partition protocols. The common 
framework for these protocols is based on a unique and novel 
group structure, where each group member generates a secret 
nonce which should be known to all except one. The set of 
locally known nonce instances represents the state vector of a 
group member. In a group of 𝑁 members, all members have a 
state vector of size |𝑁| − 1. Considering that the members are 
arranged in a logical circular linked list where a pointer to the 
next member indicates that the nonce of next node is unknown 
to the current node. For instance, 𝑁𝑖−1 → 𝑁𝑖  means that the 
secret nonce generated by member 𝑁𝑖−1 is unknown to member 
𝑁𝑖; i.e., 𝑛𝑖−1 ∉ 𝑆𝑖 where 𝑆𝑖   is the state vector of member 𝑁𝑖 , 
representing set of all secret nonce known to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ member, 
and 𝑛𝑖−1 is the nonce generated by member 𝑁𝑖−1. This novel 
approach of creating logical relationships among group 
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members is the key factor in our protocol. Using local 
knowledge of the secret nonce, each member can generate and 
share a large number of secure keys, indicating that SGRS 
inherently provides a considerable amount of secure subgroup 
communication using subgroup multicasting keys derived from 
local state vectors. We assume that an independent 
authentication protocol authenticates the group member. 
Consequently, we focus on the confidentiality aspect of secure 
group communication. If a member or group of members wants 
to join a secure communication group, they should initially be 
authenticated by a separate authentication protocol. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II, we give a brief system overview and discuss the 
characteristics of the group and keying system. In Section III, 
the proposed scheme is described in detail. Section IV presents 
the results of a performance analysis of SGRS against several 
well-known schemes. Finally, we provide concluding remarks 
in Section V.  
II. RELATED WORK 
The group communication over IP was first presented in 
1986 by Deering [6]. However, IP multicast itself does not have 
any mechanism to prevent group communication by non-group 
members. Afterward, with the emergence of new network 
technologies, group communication faced several new security 
and efficiency issues. Group communication can be secure if all 
group members share a common secret key, with the key 
generated and distributed through a secure procedure. Group 
communication is considered to be efficient if it has low 
computational and communication complexity. Various 
protocols have been proposed for securely and efficiently 
establishing a secret cryptographic key among group members. 
The protocols developed thus far can be categorized into three 
broad categories, as follows: 1) Centralized key distribution 
and management systems, 2) decentralized key distribution and 
management systems, and 3) distributed key distribution and 
management systems [2-5]. In the centralized approach [11,12], 
the overall key management complexity is low from the 
standpoint of a group participant; however, the centralized key 
management entity is associated with heavy computational and 
communicational complexity. The centralized approach is 
vulnerable to DoS/DDoS attacks and inherits the potential of a 
single-point failure. Moreover, tackling the issue of scalability 
in the centralized approach is a challenging task. In the 
decentralized approach [13, 14], the computational and 
communication complexity levels are distributed among the 
subgroup managers. The single-point failure is confined to the 
subgroup region at the expense of higher complexity of group 
re-keying after a join, leave, merge or partition event. In the 
distributed approach [15], single-point failures do not occur, 
but ensuring secure re-keying is a challenging task. The SGRS 
is a decentralized and distributed protocol, decentralized 
because for scalable SGRS, the groups are cascaded into larger 
groups (Section IV-E), and distributed because all nodes in 
each group contribute to computing the keying material. 
In earlier work [11], the author proposed a scheme to reduce 
the communication complexity of the rekeying process in a 
dynamic group. In the proposed scheme, the head node 
transmits a random magic number to all group members along 
with a time stamp value. The member nodes undertake a left 
shift of the magic number and calculate the new key by an XOR 
operation on the old key and the left-shifted magic number. The 
proposed scheme requires a powerful group head node which 
must send 𝑛 number of encrypted messages for a group of size 
𝑛, leading to the scalability problem. Seo et al. [12] proposed a 
group key management protocol for the cluster-based topology 
which establishes the group key using certificate-less 
asymmetric cryptography. However, this scheme is 
computationally expensive due to its use of asymmetric 
cryptography. 
In work by Mehdizadeh et al. [14], the group is divided into 
small subgroups. The rekeying process is only confined to the 
locality of the event (Join and leave) in a subgroup. In the 
proposed scheme the network is divided into two levels: the 
multicast level and unicast level. The re-keying process is 
confined to multicast level. However, it causes an issue of data 
transmission within the group. The data need to be translated on 
each edge node of the subgroup. 
In another study [16], the authors presented a group key 
agreement protocol suite based on blending binary key trees 
with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The usage of a 
hierarchal logical key significantly reduces the number of keys 
held by each group member. The key of each member is 
constructed from its child members; all participating members 
calculate intermediate blending keys independently and finally 
compute the group key.  
Other work [15] presents an asymmetric group key 
agreement protocol, in which the general construction of the 
protocol is based on the well-known Chinese remainder 
theorem in conjunction with the NTRU cryptosystem. The 
overall protocol provides an efficient solution.  
  In another study [17], an asymmetric group key agreement 
protocol based on a proxy re-encryption technique was 
proposed. The keys are arranged in a tree format, where the 
members represent the key pairs and the edges represent the 
proxy re-encryption keys. Each participating member holds the 
proxy re-encryption keys from the root to the leaf member. In 
two of the aforementioned studies [16,17], to construct a logical 
tree of keys, the parent members are computed from child 
members; consequently, members must be synchronized, 
otherwise any delay can cause an interruption in a protocol run. 
Additionally, during the setup time, both protocols depend 
upon a leader; in other words, a single-point failure may still 
arise in the system.  
In other work [18], the author presented another protocol 
based on the Chinese remainder theorem. This protocol 
constructs a tree in which each member holds two values: a key 
and a modulus.  
Most existing group key management protocols are designed 
to establish a single secure group. However, with the 
emergence of various group-based services, it is becoming 
common for several multicast groups to coexist in the same 
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network. These groups may have several common users. In 
some cases [13,19], the authors discussed the issue of the 
coexistence of multiple multicasting groups in a single 
network. This feature is similar to SGRS secure multicasting 
subgroup communication, which is also utilized in our scheme. 
However, one of these schemes [19] is computationally 
expensive because all of the keys are generated using 
asymmetric cryptography, which makes the overall process of 
key generation computationally expensive. In another scheme 
[13], the computational and communication cost complexity is 
highly dependent upon the number of multicasting groups and 
the number of users participating in each group. On the other 
hand, the establishment of the group key in SGRS is 
independent of the number of multicasting groups or the 
number of users involved in each group, as SGRS inherently 
empowers the group members to create secure multiple 
multicasting groups. 
 
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW  
In SGRS, the participating group members share the secret 
nonce and create a logical circular linked list. Using local 
knowledge of the shared nonce, each member can generate and 
share a large number of secure keys. We assume that before 
joining the group the requesting member/group is authenticated 
by an independent authentication entity using independent 
authentication protocol, largely discussed in literature [20-23],  
and further assume that the secrete nonce of sponsor member is 
known to the authentication entity. In the subsequent section, 
we explain the characteristics of the group and the keying 
system in detail. 
 Notations 
• 𝑁𝑖 = 𝑖𝑡ℎ member 
• 𝑛𝑖 = secret nonce of 𝑖𝑡ℎ member 
• 𝑆𝑖 =  State Vector: Set of all secret nonce known to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
member. 
• 𝑋𝑠 = Set of secret nonce created and shared among all 
members of a dynamic group 
• 𝑋𝑁 = Set of member ids of all members in dynamic group, 
corresponding ids of 𝑋𝑠  
• 𝑌𝑠 =  A subset of 𝑋𝑠 
• 𝑌 =  A subset of 𝑋𝑁, which are corresponding ids of 𝑌𝑠  
• 𝐾𝑌 =  A key derived from elements of 𝑌𝑠 
• 𝐾𝑃 =  Public key 
• 𝐾𝐺 =  Group key 
• 𝐸𝐴(𝐵) = Encryption of B using key 𝐾𝐴, where 𝐾𝐴 is any 
valid 𝐾𝑌, 𝐾𝑃 or 𝐾𝐺  
• || symbol for concatenation of terms 
•  ⊩ symbol to explicate a portion of  the term  
• 𝑆 ⊢ 𝑚 indicate that 𝑆 can generate 𝑚 
 
A. Characteristics of Group 
Each group member generates a secret nonce, by using 
random number generator, which should be known to all except 
one. The local knowledge of the secret nonce represents the 
state vector of a group member. In a group of 𝑁 members, all 
members have a state vector of size |𝑁| − 1, and each member 
possess a 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑋𝑠 − 𝑛𝑖−1 secret nonce. Initially, each member 
independently generates exactly one nonce and the state vector 
get updated (new nonce added or excluded) for each join, leave, 
merge and partition events by following the respective 
protocols described in subsequent Section VI. 
 For example, in Figure 1, 𝑁2  knows all nonce instances 
expect 𝑛1and 𝑁3 knows all except 𝑛2, and so on. It is important 
to note that these members are arranged in a logical circular 
linked list, where a pointer to the next member indicates the 
secrecy of the current member’s nonce to the next member. 
This novel approach of creating logical links among group 
members is the key factor in our protocol. Using local 
knowledge of a shared nonce, each member can generate and 
share a large number of secure keys.  
B. Keying System  
In the SGRS scheme, each member independently generates 
multiple cryptographic keys 𝐾𝑌 based upon the locally known 
secret set  𝑆𝑖 . A multicasting key 𝐾𝑌  is generated using the 
function  𝑓 (𝑌)  = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑋𝑂𝑅(𝑌𝑠), 𝐾𝐺). To ensure the secrecy 
of set 𝑌𝑠, set 𝑌 is used as an index value to retrieve the valid 
secret nonce 𝑌𝑠 from the state set 𝑆𝑖  of members. Only those 
members can generate the key 𝐾𝑌, holding the corresponding 
secret nonce 𝑌𝑠 of the enlisted member IDs in set 𝑌; i.e., 𝐾𝑌 is a 
valid key for all members 𝑁𝑖 if 𝑌𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑖  and 𝐾𝑌 is a private key 
of members 𝑁𝑖  if 𝑌𝑠 = 𝑆𝑖 . This infers that the group size of 
|𝑋𝑁| = 𝑁  has the following number of possible multicasting 
keys.  
𝑊 = {
𝑁!
(𝑁−1)!
+ 
𝑁!
(𝑁−2)!2!
+  … 
𝑁!
(𝑁−(𝑁−2))!(𝑁−2)!
     𝑁 is odd
𝑁!
(𝑁−1)!
+ 
𝑁!
(𝑁−2)!2!
+ …
𝑁!
(𝑁−(𝑁−1))!(𝑁−1)!
       𝑁 is even 
  
However, each member can participate in and/or start 
𝑍 number of secure subgroup communication, where 𝑍 ⊆ 𝑊. 
𝑍 = {
(𝑁−1)!
(𝑁−2)!
+ 
𝑁−1!
(𝑁−3)!2!
+ … 
(𝑁−1)!
(𝑁−(𝑁−1))!(𝑁−1)!
+ 1     𝑁 is odd
(𝑁−1)!
(𝑁−2)!
+  
𝑁−1!
(𝑁−3)!2!
+  … 
(𝑁−1)!
(𝑁−(𝑁−1))!(𝑁−1)!
       𝑁 is even 
  
For instance, assuming that 𝑁 = 7, we have a total of 119 
possible keys in the system, which infers that our scheme 
inherits the ability to create 𝑊 = 119  number of secure 
subgroups, where each member can participate in 63 
subgroups.  
The group key 𝐾𝐺  is generated by the hash function 𝐾𝐺 =
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑋), where 𝑛𝑖 is the secret nonce of sponsor member 
𝑁𝑖  or 𝑁𝑖 is the immediate previous member in the logical linked 
list if  𝑁𝑖+1 leaves the group and 𝑋 is selected based on the key 
 
Fig. 1.  A group of N members and arranged in a logical circular linked list 
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update event.  In join event 𝑋 is an existing group key, in leave 
and partition event 𝑋  is a random nonce generated and shared 
by the sponsor member, and in merge event it is the group key 
of requesting group. 
For computational efficiency, secure group communication it 
is essential, with the group key following a symmetric key 
algorithm. For example, very efficient public key algorithms, 
such as ECC [3], need a fraction of a second to execute 
encryption/decryption procedures, while a symmetric key 
algorithm such as RC5 [3] needs only a fraction of a 
millisecond to perform encryption and decryption procedures 
[4-5].  In SGRS all the cryptographic keys generated, as in the 
above discussion, are symmetric keys and have a size of 256 
bits (32 bytes); hence, in the subsequent section of protocols 
any symmetric encryption supporting the 256-bit key can be 
used, e.g., RC5 [3]; Rijndael [24], Twofish [25], MARS [26], 
and  Blowfish [27] symmetric encryption algorithms support 
the 256-bit encryption key.   
C. A Reference Framework for SGRS 
The application scenario for SGRS is not limited to the 
group of communicating nodes. As shown in Figure 2, a 
group of nodes/users {𝑁1, 𝑁2, … 𝑁𝑁} is arranged in a logically 
connected group, as explained above. All group nodes can 
access the common resources using the group key 𝐾𝐺  and a 
subset of the group can securely access resources private to 
the subset of nodes. Resources can be a subscription to a 
service, shared data, and/or a secure multicast group, for 
instance. Note that   
As an example shown in Figure 2, 𝑅𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2. . 𝑘, can be 
a service, shared memory, shared data or a multicast 
communication channel private to members 𝑁1, 𝑁3, and 𝑁5. 
The private key can be calculated by the subgroup members 
independently without an exchange of a single message, as 
follows:  
1- 𝑌𝑠 = 𝑆1⋂𝑆3⋂𝑆5 
2- 𝐾𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑁1, 𝑁3, 𝑁5, 𝑁7, . . 𝑁𝑁−1) = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑋𝑂𝑅(𝑌𝑠), 𝐾𝐺) 
 
Note that the function 𝑓 takes the list of node IDs as an input 
argument and translates it into vector 𝑌𝑆  by selecting the 
corresponding secret nonce from the local state vector 𝑆𝑖. In the 
subsequent section, we demonstrate that to maintain the 
characteristics of a group, we share the node IDs (𝑌) and let the 
member node translate the vector 𝑌 into 𝑌𝑠. This ensures that 
only eligible nodes with the required information ( 𝑌𝑠)  can 
generate the secret key.  
At this stage as shown in Figure 3, we consider that the 
network is divided into clusters/cells. Each cluster provides a 
complete set of resources. If a user who is subscribed to 
multiple subgroup resources moves from one cluster to another, 
it will invoke a single leave and single join protocol. Once a 
user becomes part of a logical group, it can generate all of the 
subgroup keys to access the subscribed resources. As shown in 
Figure 3, 𝑁3 in cluster 1 is subscribed to 𝑅1, 𝑅2, and 𝑅𝑘, which 
 
Common 
Resources
 
Fig. 2. The logically connected group members share the common 
resources using the group key. The subsets of group members also create 
multiple secure subgroups. 
  
 
Authentication and Service Access Point 1t ti ti   r i   i t 
Internet
Authentication and Service Access Point 2t ti ti   r i   i t 
Common 
Resources
Common 
Resources
 
Fig. 3. An example when one of the group member moves from one authentication as service point to another authentication as service point. Note 
that whole network is divided into multiple clusters and each cluster provides a complete set of resources. 
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indicates that 𝑁3 is part of one major group as well as three 
subgroups. When it leaves cluster 1 and joins cluster 2 as 𝑁4, 
cluster 1 runs leave protocol while cluster 2 runs join protocol. 
The rekeying of three subgroups in both clusters requires a 
single message exchange, and all subgroup keys can be 
generated by the members independently using function 𝑓.  
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME  
The SGRS protocol suite consists of four underlying 
protocols: the join, leave, merge and partition protocols. All of 
these protocols share a joint framework with the following 
prominent features:   
 Each group member contributes to maintaining its 
state vector to preserve the characteristics of a group 
as defined in Section II-A. 
 Upon the addition or removal of members, all 
members update the previous keying material based 
upon the updates shared by the sponsor node. 
 Each member can participate and/or start 𝑍 instances 
of secure subgroup communication, where 𝑍 ⊆ 𝑊. 
Upon each membership event, all members independently 
update the state vector and compute all possible keys on 
demand. SGRS protocols are highly distributed; all 
participating members equally participate in a protocol run 
except for the sponsor member, which performs a few 
additional operations.  
A. Join Protocol  
The join protocol is initiated when a potential member sends 
a valid join message to a sponsor member. The authentication 
server generates a ‘joining tag’ for new member 𝑁𝑗, as shown 
below. 
𝐸𝐺(𝑆𝑗)||𝐸𝑌 (𝑠𝑖𝑔(𝑛𝑗)) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖} 
A valid joining tag consists of two parts. The first part 
𝐸𝐺(𝑆𝑗)  is destined for new member  𝑁𝑗  only, whereas the 
second half 𝐸𝑌 (𝑠𝑖𝑔(𝑛𝑗)) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖}  is used by new 
member 𝑁𝑗 to initiate the join protocol. Due to the encryption 
with unknown keys, the contents of the tag are hidden from the 
requesting member 𝑁𝑗 . The first half is encrypted with the 
updated group key  𝐾𝐺 =  𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑛𝑖), where 𝑛𝑖 is the 
secret nonce of the current sponsor member of the group, which 
is the new member, who intends to join. This part of the tag 
consists of the vector state for member  𝑁𝑗 , as the state is 
encrypted with the updated group key 𝐾𝐺, and the requesting 
node 𝑁𝑗  does not have knowledge of the contents until and 
unless it initiates and participates in the joining protocol. 
During the join protocol run, the sponsor member verifies the 
join request using the second half of the tag. Note that the 
second half of the joining tag is encrypted by multicasting key 
𝐾𝑌, which is derived from the secret nonce of the group sponsor 
node. This key is also unknown to the joining member. Once 𝑁𝑗 
is verified, the sponsor node then shares the updated group 
key 𝐾𝐺 such that the joining member retrieves the state vector 
and becomes part of logical circular linked list of the group. 
After receiving a valid join tag, 𝑁𝑗  multicasts the join 
request  𝐸𝑌(𝑛𝑗) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖} ), and the protocol proceeds as 
follows: 
1. 𝑁𝑗 → (𝑋𝑁 − 𝑁𝑖+1): 𝐸𝑌 (𝑠𝑖𝑔(𝑛𝑗)) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖} 
2. ∀(𝑋𝑁 − 𝑁𝑖+1) ⊢ 𝐾𝐺
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑛𝑖) 
3. 𝑁𝑖 → 𝑁𝑗: 𝐸𝑌(𝐾𝐺
𝑛𝑒𝑤) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑗} 
4. 𝑁𝑖−1 → 𝑁𝑖+1: 𝐸𝐺
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑛𝑖) 
5. 𝑁𝑗 ⊢ 𝐾𝐺
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑛𝑖) 
1) In first step 𝑁𝑗 multicasts the join message encrypted with 
multicasting key 𝐾𝑌  derived from 𝑁𝑖 ’s secret nonce, which 
infers that all group members excluding 𝑁𝑖+1 receive 𝑛𝑗 . All 
members confirm the authenticity of the sender by verifying the 
signatures of the authentication server and sender. 2) All group 
members, excluding 𝑁𝑗  and 𝑁𝑖+1, generate a new group key 
and update their state vectors by adding the secret of the new 
member 𝑁𝑗. 3) The sponsor node 𝑁𝑖  shares the new group key 
with the joining member 𝑁𝑗. At this point, the newly joining 
member 𝑁𝑗 can decrypt the first half of the join ticket to acquire 
its state vector 𝑆𝑗. 4) In parallel with message 3, the member 
𝑁𝑖−1 shares the nonce of the sponsor node with member 𝑁𝑖+1. 
This sharing breaks the logical link between the sponsor 
member and 𝑁𝑖+1  and established a new logical connection 
between 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑁𝑖+1. 5) Finally, after receiving 𝑛𝑗, the member 
𝑁𝑖+1 also generates a group key.  
We consider a group of three members, as shown in Figure 4, 
where 𝑁3 is the sponsor member and 𝑁4  sends a valid join 
request 𝐸𝑌(𝑠𝑖𝑔(𝑛4)) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁3} , which infers that only  𝑁2 
and  𝑁3  can decrypt the message using 𝐾𝑌 = 𝑓({𝑁3}) . For the 
given example the join protocol proceeds as follows: 1) 𝑁2 and 
𝑁3verify the request and add 𝑛4 to the state vector. 2) 𝑁2 and 
𝑁3 generate a new group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑛3) and 
update their state vectors by adding the secret of the new 
member 𝑁4. 3) The sponsor node 𝑁3 shares the new group key 
with joining node 𝑁4 . 4) In parallel with message 3, the 
member 𝑁2 shares the nonce of the sponsor node with member 
𝑁1. This sharing breaks the logical link between 𝑁3and 𝑁1 and 
establishes a new logical link between 𝑁4 and 𝑁1. 5) Finally, 
after receiving 𝑛3, member 𝑁1also generates group key  𝐾𝐺 =
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑛3).    
 
Fig. 4.  Update of state vectors in a simple scenario when a new member 
joined the group 
  
This article is accepted for the publication in “Cluster Computing-The Journal of Networks, Software 
Tools and Applications” ISSN: 1386-7857 (Print) 1573-7543 (Online)  
 
 
6 
B. Leave Protocol  
The leave protocol is initiated when a valid member becomes 
invalid, for instance, when the group subscription time expires 
or if a valid member unsubscribes from the group membership. 
In either case, the sponsor member of the group is responsible 
for initiating the leave protocol. Here, 𝑁𝑗  is the sponsor of the 
group, and 𝑁𝑖 is the departing member. Upon the occurrence of 
a leave event, the sponsor 𝑁𝑖  initiates the leave protocol, which 
proceeds as follows:  
1. 𝑁𝑗 → 𝑋𝑁
′ : 𝐸𝑌( 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑌) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖−1} 
2. ∀(𝑋𝑁
′ − 𝑁𝑖+1) ⊢ (𝑛𝑖−1, 𝐾𝐺) = (𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑖−1
𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑛𝑖),
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚), 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚))      
3. 𝑁𝑗 → 𝑁𝑗+1: 𝐸𝑌( 𝐾𝐺) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑌𝑁) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖−1
𝑜𝑙𝑑} 
 1) When 𝑁𝑖  leaves the group, the sponsor member 𝑁𝑗 
updates its secret nonce 𝑛𝑗 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)  and 
generates a new group key 𝐾𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑗 , 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚) . The 
sponsor member also updates its state vector by updating the 
secret nonce 𝑛𝑖−1 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑖−1, 𝑛𝑖) of member 𝑁𝑖−1 but keeps 
the old value as well until the second step is completed. The 
sponsoring member skips this step if the sponsor is next to the 
leaving member 𝑁𝑖 in the logical linked list, i.e., if 𝑗 = 𝑖 + 1. 
After generating the new group key and updating the state 
vector, the sponsor member multicasts the partition message in 
conjunction with 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚. The multicasting key 𝐾𝑌  is derived 
from set 𝑌 = {𝑁𝑖−1} , which infers that only remaining 
members 𝑋𝑁
′  will receive this message. Note that even if the 
sponsor node updated 𝑛𝑖−1, it will still use the old value of 𝑛𝑖−1 
for the multicast message, until the second step completed. The 
departing node 𝑁𝑖  cannot decrypt this message as 𝑛𝑖−1 ∉ 𝑆𝑖 , 
hence departing node 𝑁𝑖 cannot generate the new group key; it 
ensures the forward secrecy. 2) After receiving the arguments 
for generating a new group key, all members excluding 𝑁𝑖+1 
generate a new group key and update the state vectors by 
updating nonce 𝑛𝑖−1 by hashing its old value with 𝑛𝑖. This step 
ensures that departing member cannot generate the group key, 
as 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is unknown to the departing member. Moreover, it 
ensures that member 𝑁𝑖+1should not generate 𝑛𝑖−1 , as  𝑛𝑖  is 
unknown to 𝑁𝑖+1. Hence, after the second step, 𝑛𝑖−1 ∉ 𝑆𝑖+1, 
meaning that a  new logical link between 𝑁𝑖−1  and 𝑁𝑖+1  is 
created. 3) Finally, the sponsor member shares the group key 
with 𝑁𝑖+1.  
Let us consider a group of four members, as shown in Figure 
5, where 𝑁2  is the sponsor member, and 𝑁4  is the departing 
member. For the given example the leave protocol proceeds as 
follows: 1) When 𝑁4 leaves the group, the sponsor node 
𝑁2updates its secret nonce 𝑛2
′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2, 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚), generates 
a new group key 𝐾𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2
′ , 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚), and multicast the 
partition message in conjunction with 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 . The 
multicasting key  𝐾𝑌 = 𝑓({𝑁3})   is derived from set 𝑌𝑠 =
{𝑁3}, which means 𝑁4 cannot receive the message. The sponsor 
member also updates its state vector by updating the secret 
nonce 𝑛3
′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛3, 𝑛4).  2) After receiving the arguments 
for generating new group key, 𝑁1 updates the state vector by 
updating the secret nonce 𝑛2
′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2
𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)  and 
generates new group key 𝐾𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2
′ , 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚). Besides, 
𝑁3  updates the state vector by updating the secret nonce 
𝑛3
′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛3, 𝑛4) . At this stage, 𝑁4 (departing node) cannot 
generate 𝐾𝐺  and 𝑛3 as 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚is unknown to the 𝑁4. 3-Finally, 
𝑁2shares the updated group key using the key derived from old 
𝑛3. The old 𝑛3is unknown to 𝑁4, hence the group key is only 
delivered to 𝑁1 and 𝑁3. The member 𝑁1 updates its state vector 
by deleting old 𝑛3. 
C. Merge Protocol  
To merge 𝑘 number of small groups into one large group, the 
merge protocol runs concurrently in ⌈log2 𝑘⌉ rounds. For each 
run of the protocol, we obtain a merged group of two 
subgroups. For example, as shown in Figure 6, six small groups 
{𝐺1, 𝐺2, 𝐺3, 𝐺4, 𝐺5, 𝐺6} are merged into one large group 𝐺16 in 
⌈log2 6⌉ = 3 rounds.  
The merge protocol is initiated when a sponsor member 
sends a valid join message to a sponsor member of another 
group. Here, 𝑁𝑖
𝑎  is the current sponsor of the group 𝑎 and 𝑁𝑖
𝑏 
is the sponsor of group 𝑏. After receiving a valid join ticket 
(𝐸𝑌(𝐾𝐺
𝑏||𝑠𝑖𝑔(𝑋𝑠
𝑏))||𝑛𝑖−1
𝑎  ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑋𝑁
𝑎 − 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 }),  the members 
of group 𝑏 know the secret of the immediate previous member 
in the logical linked list of 𝑁𝑖
𝑎. Upon sending the join request, 
the protocol proceeds as follows: 
1. 𝑁𝑖
𝑏 → 𝑁𝑖
𝑎: 𝐸𝑌(𝐾𝐺
𝑏||𝑠𝑖𝑔(𝑋𝑠
𝑏)) ⊩ 𝑌 = {𝑋𝑁
𝑎 − 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 } 
2. 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 → (𝑋𝑁
𝑎 − 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 ): 𝐸𝐺
𝑎(𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)  
3. 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 → (𝑋𝑁
𝑏 − {𝑁1
𝑏}): 𝐸𝑌
𝑏(𝑆𝑖
𝑎) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑏(𝑌) ⊩ 𝑌𝑏 = {𝑁2
𝑏} 
 
 
Fig. 6.  An example of merging 6 small groups into a single larger 
group. The merge completed in ⌈𝐥𝐨𝐠𝟐 𝟔⌉ = 𝟑 rounds. 
  
 
Fig. 5.  Update of state vectors in a simple scenario when a group member 
leave the group 
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4. 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 → 𝑁1
𝑏: 𝐸𝑌(𝑛𝑚
𝑏 , (𝑆𝑖
𝑎 − 𝑛𝑖
𝑎))||𝐸𝐺
𝑏(𝑌𝑏) ⊩ 𝑌𝑏 = {𝑁2} 
5. 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 → (𝑋𝑁
𝑎 − 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 ) ∶ 𝐸𝐺
𝑎(𝐸𝑌(𝑋𝑠
𝑏||𝐾𝐺
𝑏)||𝑌𝑎) ⊩ 𝑌𝑎 = {𝑁𝑖} 
6. 𝑁𝑖−1
𝑎 → 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 : 𝐸𝐺
𝑎(𝐸𝑌(𝑆𝑖−1
𝑎 , (𝑋𝑠
𝑏 − 𝑛𝑚
𝑏 ))||𝐾𝐺
𝑏)||𝑌𝑎) ⊩
𝑌𝑎 = {𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 } 
1) The sponsor of group 𝑏 sends the join message, encrypted 
with key 𝐾𝑌, as derived from {𝑋𝑁
𝑎 − 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 }, inferring that only 
the sponsor members of group 𝑎  receive the Join message. 
Sponsor member 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 confirms the authenticity of the sender by 
verifying the signatures. 2) The sponsor of group 𝑎 multicasts 
the updated message, meaning that all group members 
excluding 𝑁𝑖+1  update the value of 𝑛𝑖
𝑎 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑖
𝑎, 𝐾𝐺
𝑎). 𝑁𝑖+1 
cannot update because 𝑛𝑖
𝑎 ∉ 𝑆𝑖+1 . The updated value of 𝑛𝑖
𝑎 
ensures backward secrecy. 3) 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 shares his state vector with all 
members of group 𝑏,  except the tail member 𝑁1
𝑏 . To ensure 
this, 𝑁𝑖
𝑎  multicasts the message using 𝐾𝑌 , which is derived 
from the secret of head member 𝑁𝑚
𝑏  i.e., 𝑛𝑚
𝑏 . 4) 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 shares a set 
{𝑛𝑚
𝑏 , (𝑆𝑖
𝑎 − 𝑛𝑖
𝑎)} of secret values with 𝑁1
𝑏  and straight away, 
member 𝑁1
𝑏 breaks the logical link with 𝑁𝑚
𝑏  and establishes a 
new logical link with member 𝑁𝑖
𝑎. Note that messages 2 and 3 
are sent by the sponsor member of group 𝑎,  but they are 
encrypted with keys derived from group 𝑏.  The rationale 
behind this choice is to prevent the disclosure of  𝑆𝑖
𝑎 from other 
members of group 𝑎.  5) At this stage, the sponsor member 
shares the vector 𝑋𝑆
𝑏 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑏  with all members of group 𝑎 , 
excluding 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 . The message is encrypted with 𝐾𝐺
𝑎 and further 
encrypted with 𝐾𝑌  derived from 𝑁𝑖
𝑎 ; this infers that the 
message is prevented from being accessed by 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎  and all 
members of group 𝑏. 6) 𝑁𝑖−1
𝑎  shares a set {𝑛𝑖
𝑎 , (𝑋𝑠
𝑏 − 𝑛𝑚
𝑏 )} of 
secret values with 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 , and straight away member 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑏  breaks 
the logical link with 𝑁𝑖
𝑏 and establishes a new logical link with 
member 𝑁𝑚
𝑏 , with  group 𝑏  added between 𝑁𝑖
𝑎  and 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑎 . All 
members of groups 𝑏 and 𝑎 shared the common group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑏 
and updated the state vectors with new secret values while 
maintaining the logical links.  
Let’s consider two groups 𝑎 and 𝑏 each with three member 
nodes, as shown in Figure 7, where 𝑁3
𝑏 sponsor member  of 
groups 𝑏  sends a valid merge request to 𝑁2
𝑎 , the sponsor 
member of group 𝑎. For the given example the merge protocol 
proceeds as follows:. 1) 𝑁2
𝑎 verifies the request, and updates his 
secret nonce 𝑛2
𝑎′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2
𝑎 , 𝐾𝐺
𝑎)  and state vector 𝑆2
𝑎 . 2) 
𝑁2
𝑎 informs all group members, excluding 𝑁3
𝑎  to updated state 
vectors by updating 𝑛2
𝑎′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2
𝑎 , 𝐾𝐺
𝑎) . 3) 𝑁2
𝑎  shares his 
state vector with the members of group 𝑏,  except tail member 
𝑁1
𝑏 , to guarantee this, 𝑁2
𝑎  multicast the message using 𝐾𝑌 
which is derived from the secret of head member 𝑁3
𝑏 i-e, 𝑛3
𝑏 . 4) 
𝑁2
𝑎 shares a set {𝑛3
𝑏 , (𝑆2
𝑎 − 𝑛2
𝑎)} of secret values with 𝑁1
𝑏; this 
ensures that the member 𝑁1
𝑏 broke the logical link with 𝑁3
𝑏 and 
established a new logical link with member 𝑁2
𝑎.  5) Now 
sponsor member 𝑁2
𝑎  shares the vector 𝑋𝑆
𝑏 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑏  with all 
members of the group 𝑎 excluding 𝑁3
𝑎. The message is 
encrypted with 𝐾𝐺
𝑎 and further encrypted with 𝐾𝑌 derived from 
𝑛2
𝑎; this infers the message is prevented from being accessed by 
𝑁3
𝑎. 6) 𝑁1
𝑎 shares a set {𝑛2
𝑎 , (𝑋𝑠
𝑏 − 𝑛3
𝑏)} of secret values with 
𝑁3
𝑎, which means the member 𝑁3
𝑎 broke the logical link with 
𝑁2
𝑎  and established a new logical link with member 𝑁3
𝑏 , in 
other words,  group 𝑏 is added between 𝑁2
𝑎 and 𝑁3
𝑎.  
D. Partition Protocol  
Assume that there is a group of 𝑋𝑁  members where 
 𝑋𝑀members leave the group simultaneously and are left with 
𝑋𝑁
′  members. Occasionally, a fault in the network disconnects a 
large number of nodes simultaneous. Upon the occurrence of a 
partition event, the current sponsor of group 𝑁𝑖 will initiate the 
partition protocol, which proceeds as follows: 
1. 𝑁𝑖 → 𝑋𝑁
′ : 𝐸𝑌(𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑌𝑁) ⊩ 𝑌 = {⋂ 𝑆𝑗𝑗  , ∀ 𝑁𝑗 ∈
𝑋𝑁
′ } 
2. ∀(𝑋𝑁
′ − 𝑁𝑖−1) ⊢ 𝑆𝑗 = 𝐺(𝑆𝑗)  ^ 𝐾𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑖, 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚) 
3. 𝑁𝑖 → 𝑁𝑖−1: 𝐸𝑌( 𝐾𝐺) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑌) ⊩ 𝑌𝑁 = {⋂ 𝑆𝑗𝑗  , ∀ 𝑁𝑗 ∈
𝑋𝑁
′ } 
 1) Upon the occurrence of a partition event, the sponsor 
member 𝑁𝑗 updates its secret nonce 𝑛𝑗 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚) 
and generates a new group key 𝐾𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑗, 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚). The 
sponsor member multicast the partition message in 
conjunction with 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 . The multicasting key 𝐾𝑌  is derived 
from the set 𝑌𝑁 = {⋂ 𝑆𝑗𝑗  , ∀ 𝑁𝑗 ∈ 𝑋𝑁
′ }, which infers that only 
remaining members 𝑋𝑁
′  will receive this message. This also 
infers that all members 𝑛𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑁
′  remove all members 𝑛𝑘 ∈  𝑋𝑀 
from the local secret list. 2) After having received the 
arguments for generating a new group key, all members 
excluding 𝑁𝑖−1 generate the new group key and update the state 
vectors by running function  𝐺 . Function 𝐺  updates the state 
vector of all remaining members by discarding all of the secrets 
which cannot be generated and those which belong to 𝑋𝑀. For 
instance, if {𝑁𝑖+1, … 𝑁𝑗} ∈ 𝑋𝑀 , then function 𝐺  updates 𝑛𝑖 =
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛𝑖, 𝑛𝑗), where 𝑛𝑗  is the secret of the head member among 
contiguous departing members in the logical linked list. In the 
worst case, when leaving members are noncontiguous, function 
𝐺 will perform |𝑋𝑁 − 𝑋𝑀| number of hash operations to update 
each member’s state vector. In best case, when all leaving 
members are contiguous, function 𝐺  must perform only one 
hash operation to update each member’s state vector. 3) 
Sponsor member 𝑁𝑖 sends the group key to 𝑁𝑖−1 explicitly, as 
node 𝑁𝑖−1 does not know the value of 𝑛𝑗. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Update of state vectors in a simple scenario when two groups 
merged and share a common group key 
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We consider a group of six members {𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁3, 𝑁4, 𝑁5} =
𝑋6, as shown in Figure 8, where 𝑁3 is the sponsor member and 
{𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁5}  leave the group simultaneously. For the given 
example the partition protocol proceeds as follows: 1) The 
sponsor member 𝑁3 generates a new group key 𝐾𝐺 =
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛3, 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)  and multicast the partition message, 
including the new group key and a list of members 𝑋𝑀 =
{𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁5} ,  to 𝑁4 and  𝑁6  using encryption key 𝐾𝑌  derived 
from 𝑌𝑆 = {𝑛1, 𝑛4, 𝑛6} . 2) After receiving the partition 
message,  all remaining members  update the state vector, 
where 𝑛3
′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛3, 𝑛5)   𝑛4
′ = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛4, 𝑛5)  and 𝑛6
′ =
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛2, 𝑛6)  and generate the group key 
𝐾𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑛3, 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚).  
E. Scalable SGRS for Larger Group 
For each join and leave message, we are required to perform 
a hash operations proportional to the group size. SGRS may 
encounter a scalability problem when the group size reaches 
millions of users. For instance, in a group of one million 
members, each member must maintain a state vector of 999999 
nonce instances. In terms of memory consumption, this will 
require approximately 40MB, which is not an issue for modern 
end-user devices, but for each leave and join event, the protocol 
requires the performance of nearly one million hash operations. 
With such a large group size, the probability of the occurrence 
of a leave or join event also increases.  
The problem of scalability can be solved by dividing the 
large group into smaller cascaded groups arranged in multiple 
layers, as shown in Figure 9. Let us consider  𝑁 number of 
members divided into 𝑘 number of groups with each group 
(𝐺𝑖)  having its group key 
(𝐾𝐺
𝑖  ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2,3. . 𝑘)  shared and generated, as discussed in 
relation to the SGRS protocol suite. All of these groups can 
generate a supergroup (𝑆𝐺𝑖) by considering each group (𝐺𝑖)  
as a logical member of the supergroup and considering the 
corresponding group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑖  as their secret nonce. With this 
type of arrangement, all of the groups and group members share 
a common group key generated at the supergroup level. The 
supergroup (𝑆𝐺𝑖)  can further be cascaded to generate an 
ultra-supergroup (𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑖), and so on.  
The cascaded group limits the required number of nonce 
updates for the new group key to the lowest group level. For 
example, consider two levels which are cascading, where 
groups join to create a supergroup (𝑆𝐺). If a leave or join event 
occurs in group 𝐺𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐺, the SGRS will run locally and will 
produce the new group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑖 , which will further serve as an 
updated nonce of group member 𝐺𝑖 at the supergroup level. At 
the supergroup level, all of the group members then generate 
the new group key, as follows: 
1. 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑆(𝐺𝑖) ⊢ 𝐾𝐺
𝑖  (𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑘𝑒𝑦) 
2. ∀ (𝐺𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝐺 − 𝐺𝑖−1) ⊢ 𝐾𝑆𝐺 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐾𝑆𝐺 , 𝐾𝐺
𝑖 ) 
3. 𝐴𝑛𝑦 𝐺𝑗 → 𝐺𝑖−1: 𝐸𝑌( 𝐾𝐺)  ⊩ 𝑌𝑁 = {𝐺𝑖+1} 
1) An SGRS event occurs, leading to production of new local 
group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑖 . 2) At the supergroup level, all group members, 
excluding 𝐺𝑖−1, generate new a supergroup key and share it 
with local members. 3) Any other group members 𝐺𝑗 can send 
the updated group key to 𝐺𝑖+1.  
For a cascaded group solution for the scalable SGRS scheme, 
we make one important assumption. At the group level, the 
sponsor member is considered to be a permanent and trusted 
member who does not share upper-level keys, except for the 
final supergroup key, with local members.  
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
A. Security Analysis 
There are four major security apprehensions regarding group 
communication: group key secrecy, backward secrecy, forward 
secrecy and key independence [3,6]. SGRS addresses all of 
these security concerns. 
1- Group key secrecy: In SGRS, it is computationally 
infeasible to generate a group key unless the intruder 
knows the secret state vector of the group members. 
 
Fig. 9.  A cascaded group example , 𝒌 number of groups generate one 
super-group and 𝒍  number of super-groups generate one large 
ultra-super-group. The group key generated at ultra-super-group level 
is shared among all super-group, groups, and group members. 
 
Fig. 8.  Update of state vectors in a simple scenario when a group is 
partitioned  
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2- Backward secrecy: To ensure backward secrecy, when a 
member or group of members joins the group, they are 
prevented from regenerating the previous group keys. As 
the group keys are generated using shared secrets, at the 
time when a member or group of members joins the group, 
the secret nonce of the sponsor member has been updated 
using a one-way hash function. Thus, upon the occurrence 
of a join event, the requisite material to re-generate the 
previous group key is destroyed. In the Join and leave 
protocol, this step ensures this property. 
3- Forward secrecy: When a member or group of members 
leaves the group, they are precluded from 
knowing/generating future group keys. In both algorithm 2 
and algorithm 4, step 2 ensures this property. As the group 
TABLE I 
A COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION COST COMPARISON OF GROUP KEY PROTOCOLS 
Schemes PROTOCOL 
Comp. 
 Complexity 
Comm. Complexity Comm. Cost in bytes 
 Join (3 log2 𝑁 + 9)𝐸𝑥 + (4 + 2𝑁)𝐸 2𝐵𝐶 𝑁 𝐶𝐾 + 𝑁  𝐶𝐾  (2𝑁 − 1) 
Kim et. al [16] Leave (3 log2 𝑁 + 9)𝐸𝑥 + (2 + 2𝑁)𝐸 1𝐵𝐶 𝑁  𝐶𝐾 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁 
 Merge 
(3 log2 𝑁 + 9)𝐸𝑥 +  
(2𝑘(1 + 𝑁) + 1 + 𝑁)𝐸 
(1 + 2𝑘)𝐵𝐶 
𝐶𝐾
𝑘
 (𝑘𝑁 − 𝑁)(2𝑁 − 𝑘) 
+ 𝑁(2𝑛 − 1) 𝐶𝐾 
 Partition 
(3 log2 𝑁 + 9)𝐸𝑥 
+ 𝑚𝑖𝑁(2𝑘, 𝑁/2)𝐸 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(2𝑘, 𝑁/2)𝐵𝐶 𝑘 𝑁 𝐶𝐾  𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁 
 
Join (2𝑁2 + 𝑁)𝑀𝑢 + (5 + 𝑁)𝐸 2𝑈𝐶 + 1𝐵𝐶 (2𝑁 + 1)𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝑁 𝐶𝐾 
Leave (2𝑁2 + 𝑁)𝑀𝑢 + (1 + 𝑁)𝐸 1𝐵𝐶 𝑁 𝐼𝑛𝑡 
X. Lv et. al [15] 
 
Merge (2𝑁3 +  𝑁2 + 𝑁)𝑀𝑢 + (5 + 𝑁)𝐸 𝑘𝐵𝐶 + 2𝑘𝑈𝐶 (𝑁2 −
𝑁2
𝐾
 )(𝐶𝐾 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡) 
Partition (2|𝐺𝑖|2 + |𝐺𝑖|)𝑀𝑢 + (5 + 𝑁)𝐸  𝑘𝐵𝐶 (𝑁2 −
𝑁2
𝐾
 )𝐼𝑛𝑡 
Chen  [17] 
Join (4 log2 𝑁)𝐸𝑥 + (5 + 2𝑁 log2 𝑁 )𝐸 (2𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁)𝑀𝐶 + 2𝐵𝐶 
𝐶𝐾(2 log2 𝑁 + 2) + 
𝑁 𝐶𝐾(log2 𝑁 + 1) 
Leave (2 log2 𝑁)𝐸𝑥 + 2ℎ (2 + 2𝑁 log2 𝑁 )𝐸 (2𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁)𝑀𝐶 
𝐶𝐾2𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁 + 
𝑁 𝐶𝐾(log2 𝑁 + 1) 
Mehdizadeh et al. [14] 
Join (6𝑁2 + 3𝑁)𝑀𝑢 + (8 + 4𝑁)𝐸 3𝑈𝐶 + 2𝑀𝐶 2𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝐾 (𝐾 +
𝑁
𝐾
+ 1 + log2 𝐾)  
Leave (6𝑁2 + 3𝑁)𝑀𝑢 + (6 + 4𝑁)𝐸 4𝑈𝐶 + 2𝑀𝐶 4𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝐾 (𝐾 +
𝑁
𝐾
− 3 + log2 𝐾)  
Zhong et al. [13 
Join (8 +
𝑁
𝐾
+ 2𝐾+1 + log2𝐾) 𝐸 + 2𝐸𝑥 1𝑈𝐶 + 3𝐵𝐶 5𝑁𝐶𝐾 + 1𝐼𝑛𝑡 
Leave (9 +
𝑁
𝐾
+ 2𝐾+1 + log2𝐾) 𝐸 + 𝐸𝑥 3𝐵𝐶 5𝑁𝐶𝐾 
SGRS 
Join (𝑁 − 1)𝐻 + (𝑁 + 2)𝐸 2𝑈𝐶 + 1𝐵𝐶 𝑁 𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝐾 
Leave 2𝑁𝐻 + 2𝑁𝐸 2𝑈𝐶 + 1𝐵𝐶 (𝑁 − 1)𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝐾 
Merge (2𝐾 − 1) [(7 +
𝑁
𝐾
) + (
𝑁
𝐾
− 1) 𝐻] 
(3𝐾 − 3)𝑈𝐶 + 
(3𝐾 − 3)𝐵𝐶 
4𝐾𝐶𝐾 + (3 +
𝑁
𝐾
)
𝑁
𝐾
𝐼𝑛𝑡 
Partition (𝑁 + 2𝐾)𝐸 + (𝐾 + 𝑁 − 2)𝐻 𝐾𝐵𝐶 + 𝐾𝑈𝐶 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐾 𝐶𝐾 
     
Please note the following for  Table-1 
 E=encryptions/decryptions; Ex= modular exponentiations; Mu = multiplications;  H= hash operation;  K= number of groups to be merged, partitioned or 
coexists in same network;  |Gi| = size of ith group; UC= Unicast Message, BC= Broadcast Message, k=Number of Groups, CK= 32 bytes (Represents Size of 
Cryptographic Key, Hash, and Signature), Int= 4 bytes( Represents Size of the nonce, Node Ids and Integers).   
  
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keys are generated using shared secrets, at the time when a 
member or group of members leaves the group, we update 
the secret state vectors of all group members using a 
one-way hash function. Note that upon a leave event, it is 
not necessary to update the entire state vector, and the 
multicasting keys are generated by including a new group 
key as an argument which ensures that multicasting keys 
cannot be used by leaving members. 
4- Key Independence: In SGRS, group key generation is 
independent of previously generated group keys. Any 
knowledge of previously known group keys cannot help 
discover any other group key. 
B.  Efficiency Analysis 
This section analyzes the efficiency of SGRS in terms of 
computational and message complexity against earlier works 
[13-17]. We consider that encryption should protect all types of 
keying materials exchanged among group members. Further, 
we assume that encryption and decryption have identical 
computational costs, represented by 𝐸 ; for instance, the 
exchange of an encrypted unicast message increases the 
computational cost by 2𝐸 , whereas an encrypted broadcast 
message increases the computational cost by (1 + 𝑁)𝐸 . 
Similarly, the encrypted multicast message adds (1 + 𝑘)𝐸 to 
the total computational cost. Here, 𝐾 denotes the size of the 
multicasting group. Additionally, we presume that the 
computational price of an asymmetric key pair and an 
asymmetric proxy re-encryption key are identical.  
To present the computational analysis of the results of earlier 
work [13,14], we make a few extra assumptions. In 
Mehdizadeh et al. [14], the group is divided into two network 
levels: the multicast level and the unicast level. We assume that 
the network of size 𝑁 is divided into 𝐾 subgroups, each of size 
|𝐺𝑖| = 𝑁/𝑘 . Hence, in Mehdizadeh et al. [14], we have 
2𝑘+1 − 1 nodes at the multicast level and 𝑁 number of nodes at 
the unicast level. In the performance analysis section, the 
author overlooked the rekeying cost induced at the multicast 
level. At the multicast level, the keys are arranged in a logical 
key hierarchy (LKH) and the key tree is a binary balanced tree. 
Upon each key update event, the multicast server must send at 
least one multicast message to all leave 2𝑘+1 − 1  nodes. In 
Zhong et al. [13] the authors discussed the issue of the 
coexistence of multiple multicasting groups in a single 
network. However, in that work [13], the computational and 
communication cost complexity is highly dependent on the 
number of multicasting groups and the number of users 
participating in each group. If there are 𝐾  number of 
multicasting services, in upper case, we have 2𝑘 − 1  key 
encryption keys (KEKs) while in lower case, if all users are 
subscribed to one multicast service, there will simply be a 
single KEK. For our analysis, we consider the lower case 
scenario.  
Table I presents a computational cost comparison of SGRS 
and the approaches by Kim et al. [16], Lv et al. [15], Chen [17] 
Mehdizadeh et al. [14] and Zhong et al. [13]. All of the 
proposed schemes require at least  𝑁  number of 
encryption/decryption operations because there is at least one 
broadcast message in all types of protocol runs. However, in 
two works ([16] and [17]) the significant contribution of the 
computational cost is made by the exponential operations, 
requiring 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁)  modular exponential operations. In two 
other approaches [14,15], multiplication operations are the 
major contributors, and both require 𝑂(𝑁2)  multiplication 
operations. Zhong et al. [13] is very efficient, but that scheme 
requires the re-encryption and translation of each message by 
the subgroup leader, whereas in SGRS, the significant 
contribution to the computational cost stems from the one-way 
hash function, requiring 𝑂 (𝑁) hash operations for the join and 
leave protocols, while it is limited to the number of groups and 
the size of the group in the merge and partition protocols. In 
SGRS, the computational workload is well distributed among 
the group members. For instance, in the join protocol, each 
member performs one hash operation, while in the leave 
protocol, each member performs two hash operations. SGRS is 
persistent, and during the protocol run, the availability of the 
correct group key is independent of the failure of one or a set of 
members.  
Table I also presents the communication complexity and a 
cost comparison of SGRS and the approaches by Kim et al. 
[16], Lv et al. [15], Chen [17] Mehdizadeh et al. [14] and Zhong 
et al. [13]. The communication complexity determines the 
number of messages exchanged, whereas communication cost 
determines the total amount of data exchanged during the 
protocol run. In terms of the communication complexity and 
considering the number of join and leave protocols, the 
approaches by Zhong et al. and by Chen [13, 17] are the most 
expensive. Considering join and leave protocol, SGRS and the 
approaches by Lv et al. and Kim et al. [15] and [16] have very 
low and almost similar levels of communication complexity. 
For the merge protocol, SGRS is expensive compared to two 
earlier studies [15] and [16], while in the case of a partition 
protocol, the approach by Kim et al. [16] is the most expensive 
protocol.  
 
Fig. 10.  The total amount of data exchanged for different number of 
join requests with group size of 100 
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However, the communication cost concerning the total data 
exchange gives a different conclusion.  For simplicity of 
determining the communication, during merge and partition 
protocols, we consider that the merging or partitioning groups 
are of identical sizes. Further, we consider the best case 
condition for Kim et al. [16]; for instance, we assume that a 
blinded keys tree is always a perfect binary tree with at most 
2 1N   nodes. In a merge protocol after tree sharing, we 
consider that the protocol require one BC to share the group 
key, while in the partition protocol, we consider in each round 
sponsor node must broadcast one blinded key. To calculate the 
total amount of data exchanged, we assume that the integers, 
nonce, and the member IDs are 4 bytes in size. The 
cryptographic keys, hash, and signatures size are considered to 
be 32 bytes. The communication cost results are shown in 
Figure 10-13.  
Figure 10 shows the comparison results of the total amount 
of data exchanged for the join protocol assuming a group of 100 
members receiving 5 to 25 joining requests. It is quite clear that 
SGRS outperform all of the other schemes. Figure 11 depicts 
the comparison results of the total amount of data exchanged 
for a leave protocol considering a group of 100 members 
receiving 5 to 25 leave requests. It is quite clear that SGRS and 
the scheme by X. Lv et al. [15] outperform the remaining 
schemes. SGRS is slightly expensive compared to that by X. Lv 
et al. [15], but the performance gap is too small. Figures 12 and 
13 depict the comparison results considering the total amount 
of data exchanged for the merge and partition protocols, 
respectively. In the merge protocol, we consider that 15 
identically sized groups are merged to create one single large 
group, while we assume that one single large group is 
partitioned into 15 small identically sized groups; the small 
group size varies from 7 to 34. It is quite clear that SGRS 
outperform both Kim et al. [16] and X. Lv et al. [15].  
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel group key agreement 
scheme for the dynamic group, SGRS. Our scheme is 
distributed yet does not require synchronization among group 
members to share and update the keys. However, in the case of 
cascaded membership events, group members should perform 
all necessary update operations, especially updating the local 
group key, before moving to the next membership event. 
Additionally, our solution inherently provides a considerable 
amount of secure subgroup multicast communication using 
subgroup multicasting keys derived from state vectors. 
Moreover, SGRS establishes a symmetric group key, which 
ensures that group communication is computationally efficient.  
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